Moral Man and Immoral Society is a fairly old book. It was written during a period when technology, religion, moral awareness, and respect for human dignity were developing very rapidly. Despite the rapid development, ironically the Great Depression arrived, and society became engulfed in shock through an endless war. The overall content of this book describes the conflict between individual morality and the morality of society, set against the backdrop of the era. And one of the fresh? facts I came to learn while reading was that this book - which I had picked up thinking it was sociology, or about organizations and the philosophy of mind - had its starting point in theology. While reading the book, I was able to grasp, at least a little, the background of how an attentive father who is faithful to his family as an individual can, depending on the times, the situation, and the organization, sometimes turn into a cold-hearted executive, discharge polluted water, or destroy the environment through mass capture at sea. Looking back on what kind of person I am as well, I'd like to copy down a few introductory passages that left a strong impression.
It is impossible for one group to consistently maintain an unselfish stance toward another group strong enough to deliver powerful redemption. Nor is it even thinkable that competing groups would each so highly esteem the other's moral capacity as to give up their own actual interests.
Moreover, the highest form of unselfishness - sacrifice - exacts too great a direct cost, even if it is ultimately repaid. An individual, of course, can sacrifice their own interests whether or not they hope for any reward. But how can a person responsible for the interests of a group justify the act of abandoning their own group's interests in order to give those interests to another group? On this, Hugh Cecil says the following.
This means that any morality that compels an individual to value others' interests over self-interest, and any morality that demands selflessness, is unsuitable for the actions of a state. No one has the right to be unselfish about another person's interests."
This judgment is not entirely complete. A wise statesman would not assert their own group's interests when those interests stand in a clearly unjust relation to the entirety of the human community's interests. Nor is it ever wrong for that statesman to sacrifice their own immediate interests for the sake of higher mutual interests. If this statesman refuses to do so, the result is that their own country, clinging to immediate interests, ends up losing the ultimate values of mutual understanding. Compared to individual interests, however, community interests are far less open to risk. Not being able to take risks naturally means that selfish interest becomes very pronounced, and as a result, what remains is benevolence (愛) stripped of its moral, redemptive quality.
Every attempt to realize a morality of pure impartiality in collective relationships has been proven to fail. The Black Americans have, since the Civil War, very consistently made such efforts. During the war, they did not rebel against their masters and gave them all their loyalty. Since then, up to now, their social attitude has held to the purely religious virtues of forgiveness and patience, which is also partly tied to a social inertia born less of religious virtue than of racial weakness. But this conciliatory social attitude on the part of Blacks has done nothing at all to ease the oppression by Whites.
The reason the privileged class is more hypocritical than the unprivileged class is that, in order to defend their privilege through the rational ideal called equal justice, they try to prove that privilege can contribute something to the good of the whole. Because the inequality of privilege is so deeply entrenched that it cannot be justified by rational defense, the privileged class racks every brain to invent ingenious evidence and arguments that can defend the theory that universal value generally arises from their privilege itself, and the theory that their privilege serves the universal interest.
The form of hypocrisy most widely circulated among the privileged classes is the attitude of thinking that the privilege they enjoy is merely society's just reward for their special role. As long as such a special reward for an important role in a society is accepted as ethically just and as socially indispensable (and the fact that the present-day Soviet Union, which once advocated egalitarianism, has reverted to the principle of unequal compensation is itself an example showing that this is not easily abolished), the privileged class can, even from their own subjective viewpoint, justify themselves in the name of the special character of the social function they perform.
For such an argument to be even remotely plausible when made by a privileged class with hereditary vested interests, it must be proved or at least presupposed that, even given the same opportunities, the unprivileged class could not perform the special task or role. And in fact, the privileged class always firmly believes in this assumption. Through the abundance of educational opportunities purchased by privilege and the variety of opportunities to exercise authority that come with a privileged social position, this class develops various abilities, which the privileged class regards not as the result of acquired effort but as innate talent. Because the privileged class contains many capable people, it can plausibly cover up or defend the various tricks and incompetence it commits, knowingly or unknowingly.
And yet this class blocks every opportunity for the oppressed class to develop their innate aptitudes and abilities, and shamelessly habitually reproaches the oppressed class for its defects and incompetence. Efforts to implement universal education in the 19th century served as a catalyst for privileged classes in every country to make this kind of argument. The poor could not enjoy even this much educational benefit. If they had been given the chance to receive education, then the fact that they would have been able, to some extent, to fend off the oppressors' exploitation rather than continuing to suffer it cannot be denied.
Moral Man and Immoral Society
A new, expanded edition of , the representative work of Reinhold Niebuhr, who represents modern Christian political philosophy. This expanded edition includes a renowned educator, philosopher, and authority
www.aladin.co.kr
Recently, at a library, I came across a book called Eric Hoffer, the Philosopher on the Road. I learned later, but the two books seem to have been written at quite similar times. Looking into the thoughts and life of Eric Hoffer, who held to a life almost like that of an outsider with his own philosophy for a long time, I found a lot to relate to and to empathize with. Just in case, I'm linking to the post I recently wrote about it.
Book | Eric Hoffer, the Philosopher on the Road
Library exploration, today I came to Siheung City Central Library. While I'm here, I'm planning to head to Anmyeondo. Or rather, I dropped in on the way to Anmyeondo. Walking past the bookshelves, I suddenly came across 'Eric Hoffer, the Philosopher on the Road'. The Moral Man and Immoral
normalstory.tistory.com
Reading the two books in succession by chance, I came to feel anew that the eras forming the backdrop of the two books - the Industrial Revolution and economic recession and the Cold War, and the Internet (mobile) revolution and economic recession and a new-new Cold War - are indeed remarkably alike.
