The idea that, when making a decision, we judge by comparing the actual object with the desired ideal in terms of similarity is an interesting one. The concrete method of comparison here is to count the salient features. And how prominent a feature appears can be manipulated by the way that feature is highlighted, so the perception of similarity between two objects can also be manipulated.
For example, if we want two people to feel that they resemble each other, we can place them in a context where their commonalities are emphasized. Two American college students might think of each other as complete strangers in the U.S., but if they go on a study-abroad trip to Togo in their sophomore year and meet there.. they will say, "Wow, both of us are American!" and see each other as astonishingly similar.
By changing the context in which the two are compared, you can also push down certain features and bring others to the surface. Amos noted that "people commonly think classification among various objects is determined by similarity," but he also presented the opposite view. "Similarity can change depending on how objects are classified. Thus similarity has two sides — a causal side and a derivative side. Similarity is the basis for classifying objects, but it is also influenced by the classification that has been applied." Bananas and apples look more alike because we have agreed to call them both "fruit." In other words, once objects are grouped into the same category on some basis, they look more similar to each other simply because they are in the same category. Just classifying objects, in itself, strengthens typicality.
- Similarity Theory, Amos Tversky
Therefore, to remove typicality, remove the classification!
Improving the existing HR approach, and managing my own profile too
The idea that, when making a decision, we judge by comparing the actual object with the desired ideal in terms of similarity is an interesting one. The concrete method of comparison here is to count the salient features. And how prominent a feature appears can be manipulated by the way that feature is highlighted, so the perception of similarity between two objects can also be manipulated. For example, if we want two people to feel that they resemble each other, we can place them in a context where their commonalities are emphasized. Two American college students might think of each other as complete strangers in the U.S., but if they go on a study-abroad trip to Togo in their sophomore year and meet there, they will see each other as astonishingly similar.
Both of us are Americans!
By changing the context in which the two are compared, you can also push down certain features and bring others to the surface. Amos said, "People commonly think classification among various objects is determined by similarity," and then presented the opposite view as well.
"Similarity can change depending on how objects are classified. Thus similarity has two sides — a causal side and a derivative side. Similarity is the basis for classifying objects, but it is also influenced by the classification that has been applied." Bananas and apples look more alike because we have agreed to call them both "fruit." In other words, once objects are grouped into the same category on some basis, they look more similar to each other simply because they are in the same category. Just classifying objects, in itself, strengthens typicality. Therefore, to remove typicality, remove the classification!
The halo effect occurs when self-confidence is lacking.
A lack of self-confidence mainly arises during transitional or early-transition periods of a society or a particular market. It is an instinctive (System 1) judgment that tries to grab onto stability in the face of rapidly changing conditions.
It is one way of looking outside, in unfamiliar territory, for something that feels relatively trustworthy. But — as the old saying goes, "Cultivate the self, manage the family, and only then govern the world" — outsourcing internal issues to external sources only delivers short-term solutions (results) like peeing on a frozen foot, and ultimately leaves you facing new issues created by that very approach.
Just as IBM and HP came before Apple, or Google and Apple came before OpenAI, many societies, organizations, and individuals start to gather people who sit at the top of the previous era's institutional and educational metrics during these transition periods, and quickly benchmark the cultures and outputs that those people are familiar with, in order to pick up speed and secure a competitive advantage.
(Like Moneyball, or the Thinking, Fast and Slow project)
For instance, there comes a moment when, given the market situation and what's in the news, certain things start to seem self-evident — though you cannot yet directly see them with your eyes — yet things you can to some extent anticipate, one after another. But realistically, when there seems to be nothing the organization or I myself can do right now, you end up in situations not so different from the past — like Ford, when there was no capacity to build the factory's processes, the engine, or the car itself, and so most ordinary societies and organizations end up doing what feels more "realistic," reasonable, or rational from the standpoint of what can be quantitatively predicted (through highly developed arithmetic that excludes real-world variables): hiring more coachmen, raising more horses, and stacking more bales of hay in the warehouse. There seem to be more situations like this than one might think.
But are such decisions and actions really the best? If you can't build the engine, wouldn't it be better to think from zero about the various adjacent fields — tires, seats, horns, lights, gas stations, traffic lights, even asphalt?
Probably the cause of this phenomenon is being buried in "what" rather than "why." And the cause of that burial seems to come less from individual shortcomings and more from the fierce — or rather, inertial — competitive mindset of the society or organization in question.
In a competition where you can barely catch your breath, efficiency takes top priority. Cheat sheets, family pedigrees, the "7-something-or-other" principles, and so on — questions without answers get reframed into a range that does have answers, made into a public conversation, and within that range an in-group league starts up, where recognition and rewards are given inside that group, providing them their own temporary ecosystem (since this happens early in the transition period..).
Around this point, the halo effect enters the stage of individual and group bias toward those who already have the halo as their target.
And bias ends up bringing similar people together, who pursue similar values and produce similar results — things they can mutually recognize as very economical and reasonable — very efficiently and repeatedly.
I was reading Thinking, Fast and Slow, then learned about The Thinking, Fast and Slow Project and started reading that, then found myself recalling Moneyball once again, and suddenly,
well, just thinking these things —
As of now, the vulnerability in responding to global issues, and the entropy in fixed credentials/specs, has already reached its end stage.
The mega-structuralist 'K.C. Houseman' (John Bradley), a so-called doctor, was very interested in space and especially had outstanding knowledge about the moon. In fact, he isn't a doctor — he obtained information about the moon by working part-time as a cleaner in a university and going into a professor's office as a hobby — but he realized something was different from usual and was deeply shocked. The moon's orbit had changed.
K.C. Houseman (John Bradley) keeps insisting that 'the moon was artificially built', but no one listens. Then along the way, Harper gets to know Houseman and the two join forces ...
